To clarify what is involved in linking models to instruments, we adapt quantum mechanics to define models that display explicitly the points at which they can be linked to statistics of results of the use of instruments. Extending an earlier proof that linking models to instruments takes guesswork, we show:
where the model helps to operate instruments, one makes a link across this divide. While one can interpret measured results as refuting some candidate models, we recently proved that neither they nor logic can uniquely determine a quantum model: linking a model to instruments requires something beyond logic and measured data, something well named by the word guess [1] .
Proofs of the security of quantum key distribution invoke inner products of quantum state vectors, and these depend on the model chosen. Here we prove that any given set of outcomes from a transmitter and receiver used to distribute a key can be fitted by many quantum-mechanical models which differ greatly among themselves in their inner products and hence in their implications for the security of a key. On one hand, this encourages Eve to invent snooping instruments even though she knows Alice and Bob have a proof of security, and, on the other hand, our findings encourage discovery and repair of "hidden security loopholes" [2] arising because their transmitting and receiving instruments "violate ... assumptions [that underlie their model] in ways not immediately apparent to Alice and Bob" [3] .
To underpin an examination of the linking of models to instruments, in Section II we adapt quantum mechanics to define models that display explicitly the points at which they can be linked to statistics of results of the use of instruments. The models to be introduced express "what the participants do" in terms of commands sent to the instruments via Classical, digital Process-control Computers (CPC's) that control them and that also record results from them; we call these CPC-oriented models. Section III extends an earlier proof that linking CPC-oriented models to instruments takes guesswork: For any quantummechanical model of transmitting and receiving instruments there is another model (not unique) that expresses constraints in using the instruments that must be met if the first model is to fit a set of measured outcomes. We say the first model is enveloped by the second.
In Section IV we prove that for any quantum model α of key distribution, there exists an enveloping model β that matches α with respect to measurements contemplated in α but that has smaller inner products and allows for other measurements, which, if Eve can implement them, allow undetected eavesdropping, in conflict with model α and its promise of security. For this reason, no proof can relieve Alice and Bob of the burden of making judgments about what models to link to their instruments, something implicit in [2, 3] , but here made vivid.
They can, however, put the same burden of judgment on Eve, for she too must use models. In Section V model α is enveloped by another model that expresses necessities of synchronization that Alice and Bob can manipulate to improve their detection of eavesdropping. In Section VI we indicate how models based on pre-quantum physics are also open to envelopment.
In summary, we find that instruments modeled are used in a context of circumstances and intentions which no model can fully describe. In creating an enveloping model, one formally expresses (rightly or wrongly) some hitherto unexpressed feature of this context.
As will be proved, there is no end of opportunities to assert features of context, because any enveloping model can in turn be enveloped.
II. LINKING INSTRUMENTS TO MODELS
The central issue is the linking of uses of instruments to models. By model we mean a set of equations written in mathematical language, primarily quantum mechanics, with the intent of predicting statistics of the results of using instruments (such as transmitters and receivers made of silicon and glass fibers etc.). Some of the equations of the set act as a set of assumptions from which the rest of the equations can be derived. Quantum mechanics provides a mathematical language in which to write down a wide variety of models, constrained by a grammar of logical constraints, so within a model conclusions can be proved to follow from assumptions. Because different sets of assumptions generate different quantummechanical models, quantum mechanics is a language, as distinct from a particular model written in that language; it has more room in it for diverse models that accord with any given set of experimental results than has been appreciated.
Although, as we shall see, instruments cannot be discussed independently of models, we separate them as best we can by the trick supposing the instruments are operated via digital computers. This will allow us to express "how the instruments are used" in terms of commands sent to the instruments by a Classical, digital Process-control Computer (CPC) that controls them and that also records results from them [1] . Instruments swallow commands and give back recordable results.
As discussed in [1] , parsing a stream of data from instruments into a sequence of measurement occurrences, each with a quantum-mechanical outcome, cannot be determined from the data alone, but takes extra hypotheses, indeed a kind of stripped-down model, determined in part by guesswork, which we call a parsing rule. Parsing requires guesswork, both to assert the statistical independence of one segment of data from another, and to select criteria by which to weed out artifacts in the data attributed to instrumental imperfections, such as false and missed detections. Using a parsing rule, one parses a stream of data from the instruments into a sequence of measurement occurrences, assumed statistically independent, and one formats the data segment for each occurrence into (1) how the instruments were configured and (2) an outcome from the instruments. The parsing rule makes no statement about values of probabilities of outcomes, but does assert that such values exist; it provides a range of outcomes that are possible to record as well as set of possible command sequences.
In this way it limits the models that can be tested by measured data that it parses.
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To view the linking of instruments to models we postulate an analytic frame in which (a) instruments write via some parsing rule what we and other scientists interpret as numerical outcomes, (b) they write these numbers in memories of CPC's, and (c) CPC's send commands to some or all of the instruments. We view each set-up of instruments in terms of records in CPC memories of commands sent to the instruments by CPC's and of outcomes from the instruments. Notice that we make no assumption that an instrument works as the manufacturer says it does, nor that it works the way any model compatible with the parsing rule says it does, nor that it functions statistically the same on Tuesday as it does on Monday.
While such assumptions are made in the models to be discussed, the analytic frame provides room to consider cases in which the instruments write numbers that conflict with any or all models.
We define a CPC-oriented model of a set-up of instruments to be a model that expresses conditional probabilities of outcomes given commands to the instruments. For instance, a model α to be introduced in Section IV will express a conditional probability of outcome j given a command b A from Alice's CPC to her transmitter and a command b E from Eve's CPC to her eavesdropping receiver, written Pr α (j|b A , b E ). The subscript marks it as an assertion within model α, leaving room to consider a different model β that asserts a different numerical
The same CPC's that control the instruments house in their memories CPC-oriented models and programs designed using them. These models and model-derived programs are used off-line to simulate the instruments; they are used on-line, not to simulate the instruments, but to help operate them, for example in a feedback loop of Bob's receiver, as discussed in Section V. By considering both the instruments and the models as they are reflected in files of a CPC, we conceptually separate (as well as possible) these CPC-oriented models from the instruments modeled while allowing for interaction between models and instruments.
Like any set of equations, a CPC-oriented model can be copied, so copies of the same model can be used concurrently in different places for the same or different purposes. What can be done with a model or a program depends on where it is, for example on whether it is written in Alice's CPC or in Eve's. Because the models used in programming one CPC need not be the same as those used in programming another, several CPC's controlling interacting This is the first of several types of relations among models that will be used to express interactions between the invention and the modeling of transmitting and receiving instruments used in cryptographic key distribution.
III. MODELS OF COMMUNICATION
Ignoring eavesdropping for the moment, we focus on Alice communicating to Bob, as described quantum mechanically. Consider Alice transmitting m quantum bits of raw data to Bob, with Alice using one CPC to control her transmitter and Bob using another to 
Model γ asserts the probability of outcome j given a command b A ∈ A γ for state preparation to be
In relating model γ to results in his CPC, Bob thinks of his CPC as recording detection results of Alice's m-bit transmission in a sequence of m memory segments, each of which can hold two bits, coded 00 for Alice's '0', 01 for Alice's '1', and 10 for 'inconclusive'. We will refer to these two-bit memory segments in connection with timing, to which we now turn.
A. Need for synchronization
Model γ is an armchair view of Bob's receiver that lacks the detail necessary to design it.
To design a receiver that works according to model γ, Diana must provide for synchronizing it to Alice's transmitter within some allowed leeway. To express the effect on reception of the drift of the clock of Bob's CPC relative to Alice's clock, Diana (having learned from Einstein) defines synchrony in terms of measurements 2 Although for a short transmission line of a fixed delay, Bob and Alice can use the same clock to drive their CPC's synchronously, but for variable delay, e.g. if Bob is in motion, he needs his own clock, independently adjustable [7] . And even where the single-clock design works, Bob's receiver must adjust its phase. But outcomes in model δ tell more than these projections. At each signal reception, Bob's receiver records in his CPC not only a decision among 0, 1, and 'inconclusive' but also finer distinction from which his CPC estimates its clock skew (via Bayes rule and a prior probability distribution that Diana assumes for skew). In order to record the outcomes that help estimate skew and guide clock-rate adjustment, Bob's receiver, designed using model δ, needs a memory segment for the k-th reception of more than two bits. Hence, the record previously discussed in connection with model γ is extracted from a larger record required by model δ. Remark 1: Models, such as γ and δ, express desires and obstacles more flexibly than do inputs used for this purpose in control theory [8, 9] . Alice expresses what she wants by choosing model γ altogether, not just by an 'input' of 0 or 1 to her transmitter. Because Diana wants Alice and Bob's instruments to work in accord with Alice's model γ, in spite of the obstacle of clock drift, she chooses models δ and its classical companion, model ǫ.
Remark 2:
The number of bits that arrive at Bob's receiver is model-dependent: whether a detection result for a signal is seen as two bits (ignoring skew) or as more bits (allowing 3 Must there exist a quantum mechanical model that accords with experimental results of measurements of a skew-dependent state? Yes, because, any digital record can be interpreted (nonuniquely)
as a record of quantum outcomes, and for any set of outcomes with their relative frequencies as functions of commands, many quantum mechanical models have probabilities that exactly fit [1] . 4 For discussion of Bayes rule in a non-quantum context of control, see [8] .
for skew) depends on whether the record of the signal detection is interpreted using model γ or model δ.
Recall the freedom always present in quantum mechanical modeling to shift the boundary between the 'system' modeled and the measuring instrument, for instance by counting more of the measuring instrument as part of the system [10] . In view of this freedom, we conclude:
Remark 3: Every quantum mechanical model is contingent in the sense that it is projected onto by a restriction of an enveloping model that shows other possibilities.
IV. MODELS OF VULNERABILITY TO EAVESDROPPING
Widely discussed quantum-mechanical models of key distribution assert a nonzero inner product between quantum state vectors that Alice communicates to Bob, with the consequence that eavesdropping almost always leaves tracks in the form of errors that Bob and Alice can detect. If Alice's transmitter, Bob's receiver, and Eve's snooping instruments can be counted on to work in accord with any of these models, then Alice can send Bob a key secure against undetected eavesdropping. The models can all be translated into CPC-oriented models to make visible the points at which they can be linked to results of the use of instruments, and it is to the credit of some of these models that relative frequencies of experimental results accord reasonably well with conditional probabilities of outcomes derived from the states and operators posited by the models. But we are sloppy if we forget that quantum states are terms in models, rather than model-independent features of instruments.
In linking a CPC-oriented model α to instruments, one identifies commands in model α tening instruments with a command b E ∈ E α to make a measurement expressed by a POVM M α (b E ) which has a detection operator M α (b E ; j E ) acting on H α , associated with outcome j E . Model α implies that the conditional probability of Eve obtaining the outcome j E given her command b E and Alice's command b A is 
Proof: Motivated by the idea that, unknown to Alice, her transmitter signal might generate an additional "leakage" into an unintended spurious channel that Eve reads, we construct the following enveloping model β which assumes:
1. the same set of commands for Alice, so A β = A α , 2. a larger Hilbert space H β = H leak ⊗ H α in which Alice produces vectors |v
3. a larger set of commands for Eve,
4. a POVM-valued function of Eve's commands to her measuring instruments, with detection operators
Eve's choice of POVM to distinguish |v β (0)
According to model β, if Eve chooses any measurement command of E α , Eq. (2) 
The unit vectors |w(0) and |w(1) can be specified at will, so that the factor r def = | w(0)|w(1) | can be chosen to be as small as one pleases. 2
If she can find and gain access to a channel carrying leakage states, Eve implements a model β with a value of r < 1, in which case she uses an optimal POVM to distinguish
Alice's 1's and 0's, with fewer 'inconclusives' than Alice and Bob think possible, and hence with less impact on Bob's error rate. If Eve can do this, she has more information about the key for a given rate of Bob's errors than Alice and Bob found possible when they bet on model α, thus vitiating Alice and Bob's attempt to distribute a key secure against undetected eavesdropping.
Whether Eve can implement a measurement of leakage as called for in model β with r < 1 is unanswerable by modeling; it is a question that requires work on "the other side of the divide." The point to be stressed is that the agreement between model α and a set of measured results, no matter what results, is no logical guarantee against Eve implementing model β with a value of r less than 1, or even a value of 0 which would give her the whole key while causing no errors for Alice and Bob to detect.
A. Models involving a defense function
When noise in communications channels is recognized, privacy amplification is necessary to distill a secure key [11] . Arguments for the security of quantum key distribution with noisy channels, summarized and refined in Refs. [3, 12, 13, 14] , center on a defense function. The existence of a defense function depends on a proof (within some model) of a relation between Eve's maximum Renyi information on whatever bits she directly or indirectly interrogates and a positive contribution to Bob's error rate in receiving bits.
Defense functions have been analyzed for models of Eve's use of a probe [15] and without To prove this, one uses Proposition 3 of the Appendix that envelops any model α with a model β in which S β = rS α with r as small as one pleases. The effect of making S β smaller than S α is visible for the case of B92 models [5] in Figure 4 of [12] , where S β is denoted (in notation with which our notation regrettably clashes) by sin 2α. One sees that as S β gets smaller, t β gets bigger, so that at any fixed error rate, one can determine an r for which model β allows no distilled secure key. For the BB84 model as discussed in [12] , the effect of r ≪ 1 in an enveloping model β is to conflict with the BB84 model in such a way as to increase t and allow undetected eavesdropping.
Thus, just as for segmented eavesdropping discussed above, Eve can try to implement a model β which drastically increases what she can learn for a given error rate. Again, Alice and Bob face a choice that no combination of logic and their fixed set of measured results can decide. They must make a judgment, or, to put it baldly, they must make a guess and act on it [1] .
V. MODULATION OF CLOCK RATE TO IMPROVE SECURITY
While Alice and Bob may view their need for guesswork and judgment as bad news, they can put this need to good use if their system designer Diana recognizes that Eve is in the same boat: she too must act on guesswork. Recognizing this, Diana can design a key distribution system with features that make it harder for Eve to snoop.
As discussed in Section III, to accord with model α, any receiver whether Bob's or Eve's, must maintain close synchrony with Alice's transmission in order to function. In both the segmented and the probe cases discussed above, the models α and β can accord with measured results only if Bob's and Eve's receivers work in accord with enveloping models similar to model δ that expresses clock skew contained within an allowed leeway. Recall that model δ describes a receiver as parsing its results for each of Alice's bits into two parts, one indicating '0', '1', or 'inconclusive', the other indicating skew to be contained by adjusting the faster-slower lever of Bob's clock, and, like Bob's receiver, Eve's must do this to make eavesdropping measurements at times that work.
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We suggest that Diana try to design Alice's transmitter and Bob's receiver to make the parsing by Eve's receiver impossible without use of prior information that Alice has also encoded, and that Bob has better access to than does Eve. The idea is for Alice's transmitter to be timed by a clock whose rate is intentionally randomly varied rapidly and over a wide range, and for Alice to encrypt indications of coming rate variations in her transmission to
Bob. The eavesdropping problem is different (and harder) for these rate variations than for the key because they are more perishable. Quantum-mechanical models assert that the operation of the faster-slower lever on Eve's receiver cannot be corrected ex post; that is, if she intercepts Alice's signal and records it using a receiver clock unsynchronized to Alice's transmission, there is no way to reconstruct from her record what she would have received with a synchronized clock.
VI. GENERALIZATION
Extending the proof in [1] that guesswork is necessary to the linking of quantum models to results of instruments, we have introduced the concept of enveloping models to prove that for any quantum-mechanical model α of key distribution there exists an enveloping model β it is endemic to any cryptographic modeling that invokes probabilities.
This produces a quantum mechanical model α in which 3. a fixed starting state for Eve's probe of |e α ∈ H probe,α ;
4. a larger set of commands for Eve, E β = E α ⊔ E extra (disjoint union);
5. unitary operators U β (b E ) acting on H leak ⊗ H probe,α ⊗ H sig,α for the interaction of Eve's probe with Alice's signal, defined so that
Eve's choice of unitary
6. a POVM-valued function of Eve's commands to her measuring instruments, with detection operators defined so
Eve's choice of POVM on
According to model β, if Eve chooses any measurement command of E α , Eq. (A2) holds.
But model β speaks not of the vectors |v α (b A ) but of other vectors having an inner product (relevant to the security of quantum key distribution) of
The unit vectors |w(b A ) can be specified so that |w(b A ) = r 
